"Pozsar’s argument: the moment Western nations froze Russian foreign exchange reserves, the assumed risk-free nature of these dollar holdings changed fundamentally. What had been viewed as having negligible credit risk suddenly carried confiscation risk."
This has nothing to do with dollar. Almost all of the confiscated currency was in Europe, and it has to do with invading your bank's ally. No country in the world ever assumed that's risk free, it wasn't being priced back then and isn't now, because nobody except from Russia is stupid enough to do that.
IMHO the fundamental problem is that the world wanted dollars so they gave the US gold or stuff for those dollars. If that flow ever reverses then there's problems. Bretton woods solved the gold issue. The plaza accords solved it when Japan was the problem.
Today the solution is that foreign countries but government debt. That will last as long as everyone is willing to roll it over. It's not clear how or why that stops. But if/when it does it's not going to involve the US sending out trillions worth of stuff
No the fundamental problems was the econmists at the time believe in fixed exchange rates and that's why the got suckered into Bretton woods despite it being a crappy deal, specially for Britain. I didn't help that the American at the meeting was a Soviet spy who wanted to destroy Britain.
And Bretton woods solved nothing at all, it was a system that took a very long to implment, much longer then people think and was unstable almost as soon as it was implemented.
The flow has definitely started reversing, and yep you're right there will be problems. Worldwide central bank holdings of gold just recently surpassed holdings of US Treasuries for the first time in 30 years. And I believe that's using only reported amounts of gold, when all experts agree that China has acquired far more gold in recent years than what's reported.
Key quote:
"Pozsar’s argument: the moment Western nations froze Russian foreign exchange reserves, the assumed risk-free nature of these dollar holdings changed fundamentally. What had been viewed as having negligible credit risk suddenly carried confiscation risk. For any country potentially facing future sanctions, the calculus of holding large dollar reserve positions shifted."
My only critique here is that Russia is an outlier, along with China, because they both hold large dollar reserves and have a contentious relationship with the US. You have to go pretty far down the list to find another nation that is likely to face US sanctions - and those nations, like Libya and Iran, are already heavily sanctioned!
Normally that would be a fair point (and maybe it was valid in 2022).
But given the US approach to foreign policy in 2025, one could argue that the list of countries that “have a contentious relationship with the US” (or, maybe more accurately, the other way around) is a lot longer and less clear-cut today than it was a few years ago.
I sort of feel many countries that used to not have a contentious relationship with the US have one now and thus the observation of outlier status doesn't really work anymore.
Awesome read. I always love Poszar's work, it's a shame that these days he's no longer working at CS - since most of his work is now stuck behind a paywall.
Pozsar assigns far too much weight to Russia. It’s an economically small country. He should be focused a lot more on large American companies that carry actual heft.
According to the article, Russia is just a precursor: "What had been viewed as having negligible credit risk suddenly carried confiscation risk. For any country potentially facing future sanctions, the calculus of holding large dollar reserve positions shifted." -- So the question is: what share of the global economy do these countries represent? If China is among them, this share is considerable.
China has no serious alternative to Treasuries (bc the closest competitors have lower yields). Also, other countries don’t place themselves in the same group as Russia, bc they violated international norms.
Trump’s tirades on tarrifs show that even despite him and his stupidity the American economy is still the buyer everyone wants. Even despite alienating allies and trading partners with tarrifs countries are still playing ball so to speak. This all tells that the dollar is more resilient than we think.
this is a really good article. it makes none of the mistakes of thinking Bretton Woods I was a political choice (it uses the words "collapse") while separating the difference of the financial inevitabilities and political agencies in so called Bretton Woods III (that elected leaders do indeed have a choice to withhold funds from Russia, but on the other hand, there are inevitable financial & economic effects to war, like having to commit more money for credit of shipping oil).
someone on here is saying that Russia is an "economically small country." This is like saying the learning loss during COVID was "not very big." You are not appreciating the consequences of how big of a deal war and pulling kids out of school are, all the same.
"Pozsar’s argument: the moment Western nations froze Russian foreign exchange reserves, the assumed risk-free nature of these dollar holdings changed fundamentally. What had been viewed as having negligible credit risk suddenly carried confiscation risk."
This has nothing to do with dollar. Almost all of the confiscated currency was in Europe, and it has to do with invading your bank's ally. No country in the world ever assumed that's risk free, it wasn't being priced back then and isn't now, because nobody except from Russia is stupid enough to do that.
IMHO the fundamental problem is that the world wanted dollars so they gave the US gold or stuff for those dollars. If that flow ever reverses then there's problems. Bretton woods solved the gold issue. The plaza accords solved it when Japan was the problem.
Today the solution is that foreign countries but government debt. That will last as long as everyone is willing to roll it over. It's not clear how or why that stops. But if/when it does it's not going to involve the US sending out trillions worth of stuff
No the fundamental problems was the econmists at the time believe in fixed exchange rates and that's why the got suckered into Bretton woods despite it being a crappy deal, specially for Britain. I didn't help that the American at the meeting was a Soviet spy who wanted to destroy Britain.
And Bretton woods solved nothing at all, it was a system that took a very long to implment, much longer then people think and was unstable almost as soon as it was implemented.
The flow has definitely started reversing, and yep you're right there will be problems. Worldwide central bank holdings of gold just recently surpassed holdings of US Treasuries for the first time in 30 years. And I believe that's using only reported amounts of gold, when all experts agree that China has acquired far more gold in recent years than what's reported.
Key quote: "Pozsar’s argument: the moment Western nations froze Russian foreign exchange reserves, the assumed risk-free nature of these dollar holdings changed fundamentally. What had been viewed as having negligible credit risk suddenly carried confiscation risk. For any country potentially facing future sanctions, the calculus of holding large dollar reserve positions shifted."
My only critique here is that Russia is an outlier, along with China, because they both hold large dollar reserves and have a contentious relationship with the US. You have to go pretty far down the list to find another nation that is likely to face US sanctions - and those nations, like Libya and Iran, are already heavily sanctioned!
Normally that would be a fair point (and maybe it was valid in 2022).
But given the US approach to foreign policy in 2025, one could argue that the list of countries that “have a contentious relationship with the US” (or, maybe more accurately, the other way around) is a lot longer and less clear-cut today than it was a few years ago.
>and have a contentious relationship with the US
I sort of feel many countries that used to not have a contentious relationship with the US have one now and thus the observation of outlier status doesn't really work anymore.
the set of US adversaries is not presently shrinking, to put it mildly
Brazil and India and are actually already being targeted by the current administration
Awesome read. I always love Poszar's work, it's a shame that these days he's no longer working at CS - since most of his work is now stuck behind a paywall.
Pozsar assigns far too much weight to Russia. It’s an economically small country. He should be focused a lot more on large American companies that carry actual heft.
According to the article, Russia is just a precursor: "What had been viewed as having negligible credit risk suddenly carried confiscation risk. For any country potentially facing future sanctions, the calculus of holding large dollar reserve positions shifted." -- So the question is: what share of the global economy do these countries represent? If China is among them, this share is considerable.
China has no serious alternative to Treasuries (bc the closest competitors have lower yields). Also, other countries don’t place themselves in the same group as Russia, bc they violated international norms.
Trump’s tirades on tarrifs show that even despite him and his stupidity the American economy is still the buyer everyone wants. Even despite alienating allies and trading partners with tarrifs countries are still playing ball so to speak. This all tells that the dollar is more resilient than we think.
this is a really good article. it makes none of the mistakes of thinking Bretton Woods I was a political choice (it uses the words "collapse") while separating the difference of the financial inevitabilities and political agencies in so called Bretton Woods III (that elected leaders do indeed have a choice to withhold funds from Russia, but on the other hand, there are inevitable financial & economic effects to war, like having to commit more money for credit of shipping oil).
someone on here is saying that Russia is an "economically small country." This is like saying the learning loss during COVID was "not very big." You are not appreciating the consequences of how big of a deal war and pulling kids out of school are, all the same.