To pre-empt the folks who'll come in here and laugh about how Rust should be preventing memory corruption... I'll just directly quote from the mailing list:
Rust Binder contains the following unsafe operation:
// SAFETY: A `NodeDeath` is never inserted into the death list
// of any node other than its owner, so it is either in this
// death list or in no death list.
unsafe { node_inner.death_list.remove(self) };
This operation is unsafe because when touching the prev/next pointers of
a list element, we have to ensure that no other thread is also touching
them in parallel. If the node is present in the list that `remove` is
called on, then that is fine because we have exclusive access to that
list. If the node is not in any list, then it's also ok. But if it's
present in a different list that may be accessed in parallel, then that
may be a data race on the prev/next pointers.
And unfortunately that is exactly what is happening here. In
Node::release, we:
1. Take the lock.
2. Move all items to a local list on the stack.
3. Drop the lock.
4. Iterate the local list on the stack.
Combined with threads using the unsafe remove method on the original
list, this leads to memory corruption of the prev/next pointers. This
leads to crashes like this one:
> So the prediction that incautious and unverified unsafe {} blocks would cause CVEs seems entirely accurate.
This is one/the first CVE caused by a mistake made using unsafe Rust. But it was revealed along with 159 new kernel CVEs found in C code.[0]
It may just be me, but it seems wildly myopic to draw conclusions about Rust, or even, unsafe Rust from one CVE. More CVEs will absolutely happen. But even true Rust haters have to recognize that tide of CVEs in kernel C code runs something like 19+ CVEs per day? What kind of case can you make that "incautious and unverified unsafe {} blocks" is worse than that?
Isn’t it obvious that the primary source of CVEs in Rust programs would be the portions of the program where the human is charge of correctness instead of the compiler?
The relevant question is whether it results in fewer and less severe CVEs than code written in C. So far the answer seems to be a resounding yes
"Cause" seems unsubstantiated: I think to justify "cause," we'd need strong evidence that the equivalent bug (or worse) wouldn't have happened in C.
Or another way to put it: clearly this is bad, and unsafe blocks deserve significant scrutiny. But it's unclear how this would have been made better by the code being entirely unsafe, rather than a particular source of unsafety being incorrect.
Except that it didn't fail to be the solution: the bug is localized to an explicit escape hatch in Rust's safety rules, rather than being a latent property of the system.
(I think the underlying philosophical disagreement here is this: I think software is always going to have bugs, and that Rust can't - and doesn't promise - to perfectly eliminate them. Instead, what Rust does promise - and deliver on - is that the entire class of memory safety bugs can be eliminated by construction in safe Rust, and localized when present to errors in unsafe Rust. Insofar as that's the promise, Rust has delivered here.)
You can label something an "explicit escape hatch" or a "latent property of the system", but in the end such labels are irrelevant. While I agree that it may be easier to review unsafe blocks in Rust compared to reviewing pointer arithmetic, union accesses, and free in C because "unsafe" is a bit more obvious in the source, I think selling this as a game changer was always an exaggeration.
Having written lots of C and C++ before Rust, this kind of local reasoning + correctness by construction is absolutely a game changer. It's just not a silver bullet, and efforts to miscast Rust as incorrectly claiming to be one seem heavy-handed.
But it didn't promise to be the solution either. Rust has never claimed, nor have its advocates claimed, that unsafe Rust can eliminate memory bugs. Safe Rust can do that (assuming any unsafe code relied upon is sound), but unsafe cannot be and has never promised to be bug free.
> I know nothing about Rust. But why is unsafe needed?
The short of it is that for fundamental computer science reasons the ability to always reject unsafe programs comes at the cost of sometimes being unable to verify that an actually-safe program is safe. You can deal with this either by accepting this tradeoff as it is and accepting that some actually-safe programs will be impossible to write, or you can add an escape hatch that the compiler is unable to check but allows you to write those unverifiable programs. Rust chose the latter approach.
> Kinda sounds a lock would make this safe?
There was a lock, but it looks like it didn't cover everything it needed to.
I think you missed the parents point. We all universally acknowledge the need for the unsafe{} keyword in general; what the parent is saying is: given the constraint of a lock, could this code not have obviated the need for an unsafe block entirely. Thus rendering the memory safety-issue impossible.
Ah, I see that interpretation now that you spelled it out for me.
Here's what `List::remove` says on its safety requirements [0]:
/// Removes the provided item from this list and returns it.
///
/// This returns `None` if the item is not in the list. (Note that by the safety requirements,
/// this means that the item is not in any list.)
///
/// # Safety
///
/// `item` must not be in a different linked list (with the same id).
pub unsafe fn remove(&mut self, item: &T) -> Option<ListArc<T, ID>> {
At least if I'm understanding things correctly, I don't think that that invariant is something that locks can protect in general. I can't say I'm familiar enough with the code to say whether some other code organization would have eliminated the need for the unsafe block in this specific case.
If rust is so inflexible that it requires the use of unsafe to solve problems, that's still rust's fault. You have to consider both safe rust behaviour as well as necessary unsafe code.
This is sort of the exact opposite of reality: the point of safe Rust is that it's safe so long as Rust's invariants are preserved, which all other safe Rust preserves by construction. So you only need to audit unsafe Rust code to ensure the safety of a Rust codebase.
(The nuance being that sometimes there's a lot of unsafe Rust, because some domains - like kernel programming - necessitate it. But this is still a better state of affairs than having no code be correct by construction, which is the reality with C.)
I've written lots of `forbid(unsafe_code)` in Rust; it depends on where in the stack you are and what you're doing.
But as the adjacent commenter notes: having unsafe is not inherently a problem. You need unsafe Rust to interact with C and C++, because they're not safe by construction. This is a good thing!
EDIT: Hacker News has limited my ability to respond. Please keep in mind that Rust has a large number of active fans, who may have biases for whatever reasons.
> It is worse than writing equivalent unsafe code in, say, C. The main pain point is that Rust has a rather complicated relationship between raw pointers and non-raw pointers (mainly references and box). Namely is how they invalidate each other. A good rule of thumb is to mix them as little as possible. But eventually the raw-pointer-heavy unsafe code will have to interface with reference-heavy safe code, and that's where the tricky stuff is.
> Unsafe Rust is generally much harder to get right than unsafe C or unsafe C++. There's no sugar coating it. Rust relies on many more invariants and guarantees that you have to account for than C or C++ do, so there's much more mental overhead.
matthieum, a Rust reddit mod and fan of Rust, disagrees with those posts. Whether he is biased or not is up to others to decide.
I think unsafe Rust is harder to write than C. However, that's because unsafe Rust makes you think about the invariants that you'd need to preserve in a correct C program, so it's no harder to write than correct C.
In other words: unsafe Rust is harder, but only in an apples-and-oranges sense. If you compare it to the same diligence you'd need to exercise in writing safer C, it would be about the same.
Safe Rust has more strict aliasing requirements than C, so to write sound unsafe Rust that interoperates with safe Rust you need to do more work than the equivalent C code would involve. But per above, this is the apples-and-oranges comparison: the equivalent C code will compile, but is statistically more likely to be incorrect. Moreover, it's going to be incorrect in a way that isn't localizable.
Ultimately every program depends on things beyond any compilers ability to verify, for example the calls to code not written in that language being correct, or even more fundamentally if you're writing some embedded program that literally has interfaces to foreign code at all the silicon (both that handles IO and that which does the computation) being correct.
The promise of rust isn't that it can make this fundamentally non-compiler-verifiable (i.e. unsafe) dependency go away, it's that you can wrap the dependency in abstractions that make it safe for users of the dependency if the dependency is written correctly.
In most domains rust don't necessitate writing new unsafe code, you rely on the existing unsafe code in your dependencies that is shared, battle tested, and reasonably scoped. This is all rust, or any programming langauge, can promise. The demand that the dependency tree has no unsafe isn't the same as the domain necessitating no unsafe, it's the impossible demand that the domain of writing the low level abstractions that every domain relies on doesn't need unsafe.
Almost all of them. It would be far shorter to list the domains which require unsafe. If you're seeing programmers reach for unsafe in most projects, either you're looking at a lot of low level hardware stuff (which does require unsafe more often than not), or you are seeing cases where unsafe wasn't required but the programmer chose to use it anyway.
And that is fine, because those upstream deps can locally ensure that those sections are correct without any risk that some unrelated code might mis-safely use them unsafely. There is an actual rigorous mathematical proof of this. You have no such guarantees in C/C++.
EDIT: Hacker News has limited my ability to respond. Please keep in mind that Rust has a large number of active fans, who may have biases for whatever reasons.
> And a bug in one crate can cause UB in another crate if that other crate is not designed well and correctly.
Yes! Failure to uphold invariants of the underlying abstract model in an unsafe block breaks the surrounding code, including other crates! That's exactly consistent with what I said. There's nothing special about the stdlib. Like all software, it can have bugs.
What the proof states is that two independently correct blocks of unsafe code cannot, when used together, be incorrect. So the key value there is that you only have to reason about them in isolation, which is not true for C.
I think you're misunderstanding GP. The claim is that the only party responsible for ensuring correctness is the one providing a safe API to unsafe functionality (the upstream dependency in GP's comment). There's no claim that upstream devs are infalliable nor that the consequences of a mistake are necessarily bounded.
Those guys were writing a lot of unsafe rust and bumped into UB.
I sound like an apologist, but the Rust team stated that “memory safety is preserved as long as Rusts invariants are”. Feels really clear, people keep missing this point for some reason, almost as if its a gotcha that unsafe rust behaves in the same memory unsafe way as C/C++: when thats exactly the point.
Your verification surface is smaller and has a boundary.
Ultimately all software has to touch hardware somewhere. There is no way to verify that the hardware always does what it is supposed to be because reality is not a computer. At the bottom of every dependency tree in any Rust code there always has to be unsafe code. But because Rust is the way it is those interfaces are the only places you need to check for incorrectly written code. Everywhere else that is just using safe code is automatically correct as long as the unsafe code was correct.
It's just moving the goalposts. "If it compiles it works" to "it eliminates all memory bugs" to "well, it's safer than c...".
If Rust doesn't live up to its lofty promises, then it changes the cost-benefit analysis. You might give up almost anything to eliminate all bugs, a lot to eliminate all memory bugs, but what would you give up to eliminate some bugs?
Can you show me an example of Rust promising "if it compiles it works"? This seems like an unrealistic thing to believe, and I've never heard anybody working on or in Rust claim that this is something you can just provide with absolute confidence.
The cost-benefit argument for Rust has always been mediated by the fact that Rust will need to interact with (or include) unsafe code in some domains. Per above, that's an explicit goal of Rust: to provide sound abstractions over unsound primitives that can be used soundly by construction.
> Can you show me an example of Rust promising "if it compiles it works"? [...] and I've never heard anybody working on or in Rust claim that this is something you can just provide with absolute confidence.
I have heard it and I've stated it before. It's never stated in absolute confidence. As I said in another thread, if it was actually true, then Rust wouldn't need an integrated unit testing framework.
It's referring to the experience that Rust learners have, especially when writing relatively simple code, that's it tends to be hard to misuse libraries in a way that looks correct and compiles but actually fails at runtime. Rust cannot actually provide this guarantee, it's impossible in any language. However there are a lot of common simple tasks (where there's not much complex internal logic that could be subtly incorrect) where the interfaces provided by libraries they're depending on are designed to leverage the type system such that it's difficult to accidentally misuse them.
Like something like not initializing a HTTP client properly. The interfaces make it impossible to obtain an improperly initialized client instance. This is an especially distinct feeling if you're used to dynamic languages where you often have no assurances at all that you didn't typo a field name.
I've seen (and said) "if it compiles it works," but only when preceded by softening statements like "In my experience," or "most of the time." Because it really does feel like, most of the time the first your program compiles, it works exactly the way you meant it to.
I can't imagine anybody seriously making that claim as a property of the language.
Yeah, I think the experiential claim is reasonable. It's certainly my experience that Rust code that compiles is more confidence-inspiring than Python code that syntax-checks!
It's not moving the goalposts at all. I'm not a Rust programmer, but for years the message has been the same. It's been monotonous and tiring, so I don't know why you think it's new.
Safe Rust code is safe. You know where unsafe code is, because it's marked as unsafe. Yes, you will need some unsafe code in an notable project, but at least you know where it is. If you don't babysit your unsafe code, you get bad things. Someone didn't do the right thing here and I'm sure there will be a post-mortem and lessons learned.
To be comparable, imagine in C you had to mark potentially UB code with ub{} to compile. Until you get that, Rust is still a clear leader.
That's like saying that if c is so inflexible it requires the use of inline assembly to solve problems, it's C's fault if inline assembly causes undefined behavior.
What's the alternative that preserves safe-by-default while still allowing unlimited flexibility to accidentally break things? I mean, Rust allows inline assembly because there are situations where you absolutely must execute specific opcodes, but darned if I want that to be the common case.
Yes. When writing unsafe, you have to assume you can never trust anything coming from safe rust. But you are also provided far fewer rakes to step on when writing unsafe, and you (ideally) are writing far fewer lines of unsafe code in a Rust project than you would for equivalent C.
Rust is written in Rust, and we still want to be able to e.g. call C code from Rust. (It used to be the case that external C code was not always marked unsafe, but this was fixed recently).
> If rust is so inflexible that it requires the use of unsafe to solve problems...
Thankfully, it doesn't. There are very few situations which require unsafe code, though a kernel is going to run into a lot of those by virtue of what it does. But the vast majority of the time, you can write Rust programs without ever once reaching for unsafe.
> Rust is is not a "silver bullet" that can solve all security problems, but it sure helps out a lot and will cut out huge swatches of Linux kernel vulnerabilities as it gets used more widely in our codebase.
> That being said, we just assigned our first CVE for some Rust code in the kernel: https://lore.kernel.org/all/2025121614-CVE-2025-68260-558d@gregkh/ where the offending issue just causes a crash, not the ability to take advantage of the memory corruption, a much better thing overall.
> Note the other 159 kernel CVEs issued today for fixes in the C portion of the codebase, so as always, everyone should be upgrading to newer kernels to remain secure overall.
> > That being said, we just assigned our first CVE for some Rust code in the kernel: https://lore.kernel.org/all/2025121614-CVE-2025-68260-558d@g... where the offending issue just causes a crash, not the ability to take advantage of the memory corruption, a much better thing overall.
That indicates that Greg Koah-Hartman has a very poor understanding of Rust and the _unsafe_ keyword. The bug can, in fact, exhibit undefined behavior and memory corruption.
His lack of understanding is unfortunate, to put it very mildly.
What are some compiler flags that would compile the code such that an attacker could take advantage? And what would the attack be?
Or is this just a theoretical argument, "it is hypothetically possible to create a technically-spec-compliant Rust compiler that would compile this into dangerous machine code"? If so it should still be fixed of course, but if I'm patching my Linux kernel I'd rather know what the practical impact is.
Anybody who thought the simple action of rewriting things in Rust would eliminate all bugs was hopelessly naive. Particularly since Rust allows unsafe operations. That doesn’t mean Rust provides no value over C, just that the value is short of total elimination of bugs. Which was never advertised as the value to begin with.
What? I think people think "rust without unsafe" eliminates certain classes of bugs. Are we really going to imply that people don't understand that "unsafe" labeled code is ... uh.. possibly unsafe? I don't believe that these mythical "naive" people exist who think code explicitly labelled unsafe is still safe.
The SAFETY comment is just a brief description of the important points the author considered when writing the block, and perhaps points you need to consider if you modify it. Do people just blindly assume that comments in an algorithm are correct and not misleading? In other languages they don't, I don't see why rust'd be any different.
> Anybody who thought the simple action of rewriting things in Rust would eliminate all bugs was hopelessly naive
All bugs is typically a strawman typically only used by detractors. The correct claim is: safe Rust eliminates certain classes of bugs. I'd wager the design of std eliminates more (e.g. the different string types), but that doesn't really apply to the kernel.
> All bugs is typically a strawman typically only used by detractors. The correct claim is: safe Rust eliminates certain classes of bugs. I'd wager the design of std eliminates more (e.g. the different string types), but that doesn't really apply to the kernel.
Which is either 1) not true as evidenced by this bug or 2) a tautology whereby Rust eliminates all bugs that it eliminates.
I think the answer is #2, the tautology. But just because it’s a tautology doesn’t mean it’s a worthless thing to say. I think it’s also true, for instance (a corollary), that Rust eliminates more types of bugs than C does. And that may be valuable even if it does not mean that Rust eliminates all bugs.
> Anybody who thought the simple action of rewriting things in Rust would eliminate all bugs was hopelessly naive.
Classic Motte and Bailey. Rust is often said "if it compiles it runs". When that is obviously not the case, Rust evangelicals claim nobody actually means that and that Rust just eliminates memory bugs. And when that isn't even true, they try to mischaracterize it as "all bugs" when, no, people are expecting it to eliminate all memory bugs because that's what Rust people claim.
> Classic Motte and Bailey. Rust is often said "if it compiles it runs".
That claims is overly broad, but its a huge, huge part of it. There's no amount of computer science or verification that can prevent a human from writing the wrong software or specification (let plus_a_b = a - b or why did you give me an orange when I wanted an apple). Unsafe Rust is so markedly different than safe default Rust. This is akin to claiming that C is buggy or broken because people write broken inline ASM. If C can't deal with broken inline ASM, then why bother with C?
For this to be a "classic motte and bailey" you will need to point us to instances where _the original poster_ suggested these (the "bailey", which you characterize as "rust eliminates all bugs") things.
It instead appears that you are attributing _other comments_ to the OP. This is not a fair argumentation technique, and could easily be turned against you to make any of your comments into a "classic motte and bailey".
No, the real question is whether it provides that greater value for a reasonably acceptable, commensurate effort. Looking for greater value with less effort is looking for a free lunch, and we all know TANSTAAFL.
I feel like everyone involved in the Linux Kernel Rust world is ironically woefully unaware of how Rust actually works, and what it's actually capable of. I suspect that Rust gurus agree with me, but don't want to say anything because it would hurt Rust adoption in places where it actually is helpful (encryption algorithms...)
Kernels - and especially the Linux kernel - are high-performance systems that require lots of shared mutable state. Every driver is a glorified while loop waiting for an IRQ so it can copy a chunk of data from one shared mutable buffer to another shared mutable buffer. So there will need to be some level of unsafe in the code.
There's a fallacy that if 95% of the code is safe, and 5% is unsafe, then that code is only 5% as likely to contain memory errors as a comparable C program. But, to reiterate what another commenter said, and something I've predicted for a long time, the tendency for the "unsafe block" to become instrumented by the "safe block" will always exist. People will loosen the API contract between the "safe" and "unsafe" sides until an error in the "safe" side kicks off an error in the "unsafe" side.
I should probably ask what experience do you have writing hardware drivers for the Linux kernel, but it's pretty obvious the answer is: none. I actually burst out laughing reading your comment, it's ridiculous.
My anecdotal experience interviewing big tech engineers that used Rust reflects GP's hunch about this astonishing experience gap. Just this year, 4/4 candidates I interviewed couldn't give me the correct answer for what two bytes in base 2 represented in base 10. Not a single candidate asked me about the endianness of the system.
Now that Rust in the kernel doesn't have an "experimental" escape hatch, these motte-and-bailey arguments aren't going to work. Ultimately, I think this is a good thing for Rust in the kernel. Once all of the idiots and buffoons have been sufficiently derided and ousted from public discourse (deservedly so), we can finally begin having serious and productive technical discussions about how to make C and Rust interoperate in the kernel.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but this comment is atleast partially incorrect right?
> Since it was in an unsafe block, the error for sure was way easier to find within the codebase than in C. Everything that's not unsafe can be ruled out as a reason for race conditions and the usual memory handling mistakes - that's already a huge win.
The benefit of Rust is you can isolate the possible code that causes an XYZ to an unsafe block*. But that doesn't necessarily mean the error shown is directly related to the unsafe block. Like C++, triggering undefined behavior can in theory cause the program to do anything, including fail spectacularly within seemingly unrelated safe code.
* Excluding cases where safe things are actually possibly unsafe (like some incorrectly marked FFI)
From my experience UB in Rust can manifest a bit differently than in C or C++, but still generally has enough smoke in the right area.
I believe their point was that they only needed to audit only the unsafe blocks to find the actual root cause of the bug once they had an idea of the problematic area.
EDIT: Hacker News has limited my ability to respond. Please keep in mind that Rust has a large number of active fans, who may have biases for whatever reasons.
The absence of UB, undefined behavior, everything-bad-can-happen, in an Rust-unsafe block can depend on Rust-not-unsafe code in the surrounding module. Thus, even a single block of unsafe can in theory require going through the whole module to figure out where it went wrong or to ensure correctness. And if access control was not properly used, possibly more than the module.
If you look at the mentioned patches, the fixes are to code outside the described unsafe block, in Rust-not-unsafe code. It is perfectly possible to introduce UB through changes to "safe" Rust, if those changes end up violating some assumptions in some Rust-unsafe block somewhere.
Another way to introduce UB in Rust-not-unsafe, is if no_std is used. In that case, a simple stack overflow can cause UB, no Rust-unsafe required.
Surprisingly many Rust developers do not understand these points. It may take some of the shine off of Rust, so some Rust fans refrain from explaining it properly. Which is not good.
I guess the problem here is that you and the writer have different understandings of what "the error" means.
The author is thinking about "the error" as some source code that's incorrect. "Your error was not bringing gloves and a hat to the snowball fight" but you're thinking "the error" is some diagnostic result that shows there was a problem. "My error is that I'm covered in freezing snow".
It's important to note that the `unsafe` keyword is poorly named. What it does is unlock a few more capabilities at the cost of upholding the invariants the spec requires. It should really be called "assured" or something. The programmer is taking the wheel from the compiler and promising to drive safely.
As for why there is unsafe in the kernel? There are things, especially in a kernel, that cannot be expressed in safe Rust.
Still, having smaller sections of unsafe is a boon because you isolate these locations of elevated power, meaning they are auditable and obvious. Rust also excels at wrapping unsafe in safe abstractions that are impossible to misuse. A common comparison point is that in C your entire program is effectively unsafe, whereas in Rust it's a subset.
Rust is very nice for encapsulation. C isn't great at that work, and of course it can't express the idea that whatever we've encapsulated is now safe to use this way, in C everything looks equally safe/ unsafe.
EDIT: Hacker News has limited my ability to respond. Please keep in mind that Rust has a large number of active fans, who may have biases for whatever reasons.
On the other hand, Rust has some rules that are more difficult to uphold than C, for instance regarding aliasing. Especially in the Linux kernel, where it was decided that strict aliasing should be turned off when compiling C. When Rust-unsafe is used, the programmer has the responsibility of not violating those rules. That can be tricky, and many Rust developers either try to avoid using unsafe, or lean heavily on Miri, even though Miri can't handle everything.
It's worth noting that "aliasing" in Rust and C typically mean completely unrelated things.
Strict aliasing in C roughly means that if you initialize memory as a particular type, you can only access it as that type or one of a list of aliasable types look like char. Rust has no such restriction, and has no concept of strict aliasing like this. In Rust, "type aliasing" is allowed, so long as you respect size, alignment, and representability rules.
Aliasing safety in Rust roughly means that you can not have an exclusive reference to an object if any other reference is active for that reference (reality is a little bit more involved than that, but not a lot). C has no such rule.
It's very unfortunate that such similar names were given to these different concepts.
EDIT: Hacker News has limited my ability to respond. Please keep in mind that Rust has a large number of active fans, who may have biases for whatever reasons.
Multiple reasons:
1: Marketing and social media brigading, as Linus put it.
2: Pattern matching and enums, which are genuinely good.
3: Rust has some trade-offs that are closer to C++ than C, and those trade-offs have advantages and disadvantages.
You need unsafe Rust for FFI - interfacing with the rest of the kernel which is still C, uses raw pointers, has no generics, doesn't track ownership, etc. One day there might enough Rust in the kernel to have pure-Rust subsystems APIs which would no longer require unsafe blocks to use. This would reverse the requirements as C would be a second class citizen with these APIs (not that C would notice or care). How far Rust is to get pushed remains to be seen but it might a long time to get there.
The point at which you _could_ start to have undefined behavior is within an `unsafe` block or function. So even if the "failure" occurred in some "safe" part of the code, the conditions to make that failure would start in the unsafe code.
When debugging, we care about where the assumptions we had were violated. Not where we observe a bad effect of these violated assumptions.
I think you get here yourself when you say:
> triggering undefined behavior can in theory cause the program to do anything, including fail spectacularly within seemingly unrelated safe code
The bug isn't where it failed spectacularly. It's where the C++ code triggered undefined behavior.
Put another way: if the undefined behavior _didn't_ cause a crash / corrupted data, the bug _still_ exists. We just haven't observed any bad effects from it.
Somebody (tsoding?) called "unsafe" in Rust a "blame shifting device". If a bug was in an "unsafe" block, it is not Rust's fault, but solely the responsibility of the programmer, while every bug in a C program is obviously the language's fault alone.
Direct link to the mailing list entry at [0]. The fix for 6.19-rc1 is commit 3e0ae02ba831 [1]. The patch is pretty small (added some extra context since the function it's from is short):
pub(crate) fn release(&self) {
let mut guard = self.owner.inner.lock();
while let Some(work) = self.inner.access_mut(&mut guard).oneway_todo.pop_front() {
drop(guard);
work.into_arc().cancel();
guard = self.owner.inner.lock();
}
- let death_list = core::mem::take(&mut self.inner.access_mut(&mut guard).death_list);
- drop(guard);
- for death in death_list {
+ while let Some(death) = self.inner.access_mut(&mut guard).death_list.pop_front() {
+ drop(guard);
death.into_arc().set_dead();
+ guard = self.owner.inner.lock();
}
}
And here is the unsafe block mentioned in the commit message with some more context [3]:
fn set_cleared(self: &DArc<Self>, abort: bool) -> bool {
// <snip>
// Remove death notification from node.
if needs_removal {
let mut owner_inner = self.node.owner.inner.lock();
let node_inner = self.node.inner.access_mut(&mut owner_inner);
// SAFETY: A `NodeDeath` is never inserted into the death list of any node other than
// its owner, so it is either in this death list or in no death list.
unsafe { node_inner.death_list.remove(self) };
}
needs_queueing
}
The interesting part to me is that this bug does not necessarily happen in an unsafe block. The fix happens in an unsafe block, I think the API should change to avoid this. Perhaps by forcing users to pass a lambda to do stuff instead of having to manually lock and drop?
The `unsafe` block was present because `List::remove` is marked `unsafe` [0]:
/// Removes the provided item from this list and returns it.
///
/// This returns `None` if the item is not in the list. (Note that by the safety requirements,
/// this means that the item is not in any list.)
///
/// # Safety
///
/// `item` must not be in a different linked list (with the same id).
pub unsafe fn remove(&mut self, item: &T) -> Option<ListArc<T, ID>> {
I think it'd be tricky at best to make this particular API safe since doing so requires reasoning across arbitrary other List instances. At the very least I don't think locks would help here, since temporary exclusive access to a list won't stop you from adding the same element to multiple lists.
I think it's pretty telling that there are people in this thread trying to pre-empt the expected criticism in this thread. Might be worth thinking why there might be criticism, and why it wouldn't be the case if it was a different language.
1) unsafe block still of "rust" code that rewritten in "rust" to be safe compared to previous C code.
2) Maybe there is no other way than use "unsafe" block sometimes in "rust", so is Rust a lie?
Rust constrains the code that can do unsafe things to small blocks, greatly reducing the area in which they can happen. Unlike C, where the whole of the code is unsafe.
Honestly seems like zig is shaping up to be a better fit for kernel. Regardless the language that attracts skilled kernel devs will matter more then lang.
I'll confess I'm a bit less than well-read on this, but I can't help but wonder. How can increasing the number of languages in use within one enormous project possibly reduce critical vulnerabilities over the next decade?
If we're looking beyond one decade, then:
- As with all other utility, the future must be discounted compared to the present.
- A language that might look sterling today might fall behind tomorrow.
To pre-empt the folks who'll come in here and laugh about how Rust should be preventing memory corruption... I'll just directly quote from the mailing list:
So the prediction that incautious and unverified unsafe {} blocks would cause CVEs seems entirely accurate.
> So the prediction that incautious and unverified unsafe {} blocks would cause CVEs seems entirely accurate.
This is one/the first CVE caused by a mistake made using unsafe Rust. But it was revealed along with 159 new kernel CVEs found in C code.[0]
It may just be me, but it seems wildly myopic to draw conclusions about Rust, or even, unsafe Rust from one CVE. More CVEs will absolutely happen. But even true Rust haters have to recognize that tide of CVEs in kernel C code runs something like 19+ CVEs per day? What kind of case can you make that "incautious and unverified unsafe {} blocks" is worse than that?
[0]: https://social.kernel.org/notice/B1JLrtkxEBazCPQHDM
Github says 0.3% of the kernel code is Rust. But even normalized to lines of code, I think counting CVEs would not measure anything meaningful.
Isn’t it obvious that the primary source of CVEs in Rust programs would be the portions of the program where the human is charge of correctness instead of the compiler?
The relevant question is whether it results in fewer and less severe CVEs than code written in C. So far the answer seems to be a resounding yes
It is not obvious to those who refuse to understand, and who preemptively reject case studies on the grounds that the numbers are surely fabricated.
"Cause" seems unsubstantiated: I think to justify "cause," we'd need strong evidence that the equivalent bug (or worse) wouldn't have happened in C.
Or another way to put it: clearly this is bad, and unsafe blocks deserve significant scrutiny. But it's unclear how this would have been made better by the code being entirely unsafe, rather than a particular source of unsafety being incorrect.
The definition of cause is quite clear. “Rust” is obviously not the cause, but it did fail to be the solution, here. You can’t avoid that.
Except that it didn't fail to be the solution: the bug is localized to an explicit escape hatch in Rust's safety rules, rather than being a latent property of the system.
(I think the underlying philosophical disagreement here is this: I think software is always going to have bugs, and that Rust can't - and doesn't promise - to perfectly eliminate them. Instead, what Rust does promise - and deliver on - is that the entire class of memory safety bugs can be eliminated by construction in safe Rust, and localized when present to errors in unsafe Rust. Insofar as that's the promise, Rust has delivered here.)
You can label something an "explicit escape hatch" or a "latent property of the system", but in the end such labels are irrelevant. While I agree that it may be easier to review unsafe blocks in Rust compared to reviewing pointer arithmetic, union accesses, and free in C because "unsafe" is a bit more obvious in the source, I think selling this as a game changer was always an exaggeration.
Having written lots of C and C++ before Rust, this kind of local reasoning + correctness by construction is absolutely a game changer. It's just not a silver bullet, and efforts to miscast Rust as incorrectly claiming to be one seem heavy-handed.
But it didn't promise to be the solution either. Rust has never claimed, nor have its advocates claimed, that unsafe Rust can eliminate memory bugs. Safe Rust can do that (assuming any unsafe code relied upon is sound), but unsafe cannot be and has never promised to be bug free.
Sure, but that's not really that interesting or controversial.
The more useful question is, how many CVEs were prevented because unsafe {} blocks receive more caution and scrutiny?
I know nothing about Rust. But why is unsafe needed? Kinda sounds a lock would make this safe?
> I know nothing about Rust. But why is unsafe needed?
The short of it is that for fundamental computer science reasons the ability to always reject unsafe programs comes at the cost of sometimes being unable to verify that an actually-safe program is safe. You can deal with this either by accepting this tradeoff as it is and accepting that some actually-safe programs will be impossible to write, or you can add an escape hatch that the compiler is unable to check but allows you to write those unverifiable programs. Rust chose the latter approach.
> Kinda sounds a lock would make this safe?
There was a lock, but it looks like it didn't cover everything it needed to.
I think you missed the parents point. We all universally acknowledge the need for the unsafe{} keyword in general; what the parent is saying is: given the constraint of a lock, could this code not have obviated the need for an unsafe block entirely. Thus rendering the memory safety-issue impossible.
Ah, I see that interpretation now that you spelled it out for me.
Here's what `List::remove` says on its safety requirements [0]:
At least if I'm understanding things correctly, I don't think that that invariant is something that locks can protect in general. I can't say I'm familiar enough with the code to say whether some other code organization would have eliminated the need for the unsafe block in this specific case.[0]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e0ae02ba831da2b70790...
Yes, that is what I meant - thanks for actually expressing my thoughts better than me.
If rust is so inflexible that it requires the use of unsafe to solve problems, that's still rust's fault. You have to consider both safe rust behaviour as well as necessary unsafe code.
This is sort of the exact opposite of reality: the point of safe Rust is that it's safe so long as Rust's invariants are preserved, which all other safe Rust preserves by construction. So you only need to audit unsafe Rust code to ensure the safety of a Rust codebase.
(The nuance being that sometimes there's a lot of unsafe Rust, because some domains - like kernel programming - necessitate it. But this is still a better state of affairs than having no code be correct by construction, which is the reality with C.)
Which domain doesn't necessitate unsafe? Any large Rust project I check has tons of unsafe in its dependency tree.
I've written lots of `forbid(unsafe_code)` in Rust; it depends on where in the stack you are and what you're doing.
But as the adjacent commenter notes: having unsafe is not inherently a problem. You need unsafe Rust to interact with C and C++, because they're not safe by construction. This is a good thing!
EDIT: Hacker News has limited my ability to respond. Please keep in mind that Rust has a large number of active fans, who may have biases for whatever reasons.
Do you agree or disagree with
https://www.reddit.com/r/rust/comments/16i8lo2/how_unpleasan...
> It is worse than writing equivalent unsafe code in, say, C. The main pain point is that Rust has a rather complicated relationship between raw pointers and non-raw pointers (mainly references and box). Namely is how they invalidate each other. A good rule of thumb is to mix them as little as possible. But eventually the raw-pointer-heavy unsafe code will have to interface with reference-heavy safe code, and that's where the tricky stuff is.
> Unsafe Rust is generally much harder to get right than unsafe C or unsafe C++. There's no sugar coating it. Rust relies on many more invariants and guarantees that you have to account for than C or C++ do, so there's much more mental overhead.
matthieum, a Rust reddit mod and fan of Rust, disagrees with those posts. Whether he is biased or not is up to others to decide.
I think unsafe Rust is harder to write than C. However, that's because unsafe Rust makes you think about the invariants that you'd need to preserve in a correct C program, so it's no harder to write than correct C.
In other words: unsafe Rust is harder, but only in an apples-and-oranges sense. If you compare it to the same diligence you'd need to exercise in writing safer C, it would be about the same.
How would you describe the aliasing requirements of C and Rust, and do you consider them the same, as well as equally difficult?
Safe Rust has more strict aliasing requirements than C, so to write sound unsafe Rust that interoperates with safe Rust you need to do more work than the equivalent C code would involve. But per above, this is the apples-and-oranges comparison: the equivalent C code will compile, but is statistically more likely to be incorrect. Moreover, it's going to be incorrect in a way that isn't localizable.
> in its dependency tree.
Ultimately every program depends on things beyond any compilers ability to verify, for example the calls to code not written in that language being correct, or even more fundamentally if you're writing some embedded program that literally has interfaces to foreign code at all the silicon (both that handles IO and that which does the computation) being correct.
The promise of rust isn't that it can make this fundamentally non-compiler-verifiable (i.e. unsafe) dependency go away, it's that you can wrap the dependency in abstractions that make it safe for users of the dependency if the dependency is written correctly.
In most domains rust don't necessitate writing new unsafe code, you rely on the existing unsafe code in your dependencies that is shared, battle tested, and reasonably scoped. This is all rust, or any programming langauge, can promise. The demand that the dependency tree has no unsafe isn't the same as the domain necessitating no unsafe, it's the impossible demand that the domain of writing the low level abstractions that every domain relies on doesn't need unsafe.
Almost all of them. It would be far shorter to list the domains which require unsafe. If you're seeing programmers reach for unsafe in most projects, either you're looking at a lot of low level hardware stuff (which does require unsafe more often than not), or you are seeing cases where unsafe wasn't required but the programmer chose to use it anyway.
And that is fine, because those upstream deps can locally ensure that those sections are correct without any risk that some unrelated code might mis-safely use them unsafely. There is an actual rigorous mathematical proof of this. You have no such guarantees in C/C++.
EDIT: Hacker News has limited my ability to respond. Please keep in mind that Rust has a large number of active fans, who may have biases for whatever reasons.
What?
Even the Rust standard library has had UB.
https://materialize.com/blog/rust-concurrency-bug-unbounded-...
And a bug in one crate can cause UB in another crate if that other crate is not designed well and correctly.
https://zackoverflow.dev/writing/unsafe-rust-vs-zig/
> And a bug in one crate can cause UB in another crate if that other crate is not designed well and correctly.
Yes! Failure to uphold invariants of the underlying abstract model in an unsafe block breaks the surrounding code, including other crates! That's exactly consistent with what I said. There's nothing special about the stdlib. Like all software, it can have bugs.
What the proof states is that two independently correct blocks of unsafe code cannot, when used together, be incorrect. So the key value there is that you only have to reason about them in isolation, which is not true for C.
I think you're misunderstanding GP. The claim is that the only party responsible for ensuring correctness is the one providing a safe API to unsafe functionality (the upstream dependency in GP's comment). There's no claim that upstream devs are infalliable nor that the consequences of a mistake are necessarily bounded.
Those guys were writing a lot of unsafe rust and bumped into UB.
I sound like an apologist, but the Rust team stated that “memory safety is preserved as long as Rusts invariants are”. Feels really clear, people keep missing this point for some reason, almost as if its a gotcha that unsafe rust behaves in the same memory unsafe way as C/C++: when thats exactly the point.
Your verification surface is smaller and has a boundary.
Ultimately all software has to touch hardware somewhere. There is no way to verify that the hardware always does what it is supposed to be because reality is not a computer. At the bottom of every dependency tree in any Rust code there always has to be unsafe code. But because Rust is the way it is those interfaces are the only places you need to check for incorrectly written code. Everywhere else that is just using safe code is automatically correct as long as the unsafe code was correct.
It's just moving the goalposts. "If it compiles it works" to "it eliminates all memory bugs" to "well, it's safer than c...".
If Rust doesn't live up to its lofty promises, then it changes the cost-benefit analysis. You might give up almost anything to eliminate all bugs, a lot to eliminate all memory bugs, but what would you give up to eliminate some bugs?
Can you show me an example of Rust promising "if it compiles it works"? This seems like an unrealistic thing to believe, and I've never heard anybody working on or in Rust claim that this is something you can just provide with absolute confidence.
The cost-benefit argument for Rust has always been mediated by the fact that Rust will need to interact with (or include) unsafe code in some domains. Per above, that's an explicit goal of Rust: to provide sound abstractions over unsound primitives that can be used soundly by construction.
> Can you show me an example of Rust promising "if it compiles it works"? [...] and I've never heard anybody working on or in Rust claim that this is something you can just provide with absolute confidence.
I have heard it and I've stated it before. It's never stated in absolute confidence. As I said in another thread, if it was actually true, then Rust wouldn't need an integrated unit testing framework.
It's referring to the experience that Rust learners have, especially when writing relatively simple code, that's it tends to be hard to misuse libraries in a way that looks correct and compiles but actually fails at runtime. Rust cannot actually provide this guarantee, it's impossible in any language. However there are a lot of common simple tasks (where there's not much complex internal logic that could be subtly incorrect) where the interfaces provided by libraries they're depending on are designed to leverage the type system such that it's difficult to accidentally misuse them.
Like something like not initializing a HTTP client properly. The interfaces make it impossible to obtain an improperly initialized client instance. This is an especially distinct feeling if you're used to dynamic languages where you often have no assurances at all that you didn't typo a field name.
I've seen (and said) "if it compiles it works," but only when preceded by softening statements like "In my experience," or "most of the time." Because it really does feel like, most of the time the first your program compiles, it works exactly the way you meant it to.
I can't imagine anybody seriously making that claim as a property of the language.
Yeah, I think the experiential claim is reasonable. It's certainly my experience that Rust code that compiles is more confidence-inspiring than Python code that syntax-checks!
It's not moving the goalposts at all. I'm not a Rust programmer, but for years the message has been the same. It's been monotonous and tiring, so I don't know why you think it's new.
Safe Rust code is safe. You know where unsafe code is, because it's marked as unsafe. Yes, you will need some unsafe code in an notable project, but at least you know where it is. If you don't babysit your unsafe code, you get bad things. Someone didn't do the right thing here and I'm sure there will be a post-mortem and lessons learned.
To be comparable, imagine in C you had to mark potentially UB code with ub{} to compile. Until you get that, Rust is still a clear leader.
That's like saying that if c is so inflexible it requires the use of inline assembly to solve problems, it's C's fault if inline assembly causes undefined behavior.
What's the alternative that preserves safe-by-default while still allowing unlimited flexibility to accidentally break things? I mean, Rust allows inline assembly because there are situations where you absolutely must execute specific opcodes, but darned if I want that to be the common case.
Yes. When writing unsafe, you have to assume you can never trust anything coming from safe rust. But you are also provided far fewer rakes to step on when writing unsafe, and you (ideally) are writing far fewer lines of unsafe code in a Rust project than you would for equivalent C.
Rust is written in Rust, and we still want to be able to e.g. call C code from Rust. (It used to be the case that external C code was not always marked unsafe, but this was fixed recently).
> If rust is so inflexible that it requires the use of unsafe to solve problems...
Thankfully, it doesn't. There are very few situations which require unsafe code, though a kernel is going to run into a lot of those by virtue of what it does. But the vast majority of the time, you can write Rust programs without ever once reaching for unsafe.
I recommend you read Greg Koah-Hartman's thread instead of this article: https://social.kernel.org/notice/B1JLrtkxEBazCPQHDM
> > That being said, we just assigned our first CVE for some Rust code in the kernel: https://lore.kernel.org/all/2025121614-CVE-2025-68260-558d@g... where the offending issue just causes a crash, not the ability to take advantage of the memory corruption, a much better thing overall.
That indicates that Greg Koah-Hartman has a very poor understanding of Rust and the _unsafe_ keyword. The bug can, in fact, exhibit undefined behavior and memory corruption.
His lack of understanding is unfortunate, to put it very mildly.
What are some compiler flags that would compile the code such that an attacker could take advantage? And what would the attack be?
Or is this just a theoretical argument, "it is hypothetically possible to create a technically-spec-compliant Rust compiler that would compile this into dangerous machine code"? If so it should still be fixed of course, but if I'm patching my Linux kernel I'd rather know what the practical impact is.
Anybody who thought the simple action of rewriting things in Rust would eliminate all bugs was hopelessly naive. Particularly since Rust allows unsafe operations. That doesn’t mean Rust provides no value over C, just that the value is short of total elimination of bugs. Which was never advertised as the value to begin with.
What? I think people think "rust without unsafe" eliminates certain classes of bugs. Are we really going to imply that people don't understand that "unsafe" labeled code is ... uh.. possibly unsafe? I don't believe that these mythical "naive" people exist who think code explicitly labelled unsafe is still safe.
I think the problem lies with the fact that you cannot write kernel code without relying on unsafe blocks of code.
So arguably both camps are correct. Those who advocate Rust rewrites, and those who are against it too.
I think part of the problem is people start thinking that unsafe code with a SAFETY comment nearby is probably safe.
Then the safety comment can easily bias the reader into believing that the author has fully understood the problem and all edge cases.
The SAFETY comment is just a brief description of the important points the author considered when writing the block, and perhaps points you need to consider if you modify it. Do people just blindly assume that comments in an algorithm are correct and not misleading? In other languages they don't, I don't see why rust'd be any different.
> unsafe code with a SAFETY comment nearby
That's roughly 100% of unsafe code because a lint in the compiler asks for it.
> Anybody who thought the simple action of rewriting things in Rust would eliminate all bugs was hopelessly naive
All bugs is typically a strawman typically only used by detractors. The correct claim is: safe Rust eliminates certain classes of bugs. I'd wager the design of std eliminates more (e.g. the different string types), but that doesn't really apply to the kernel.
> All bugs is typically a strawman typically only used by detractors. The correct claim is: safe Rust eliminates certain classes of bugs. I'd wager the design of std eliminates more (e.g. the different string types), but that doesn't really apply to the kernel.
Which is either 1) not true as evidenced by this bug or 2) a tautology whereby Rust eliminates all bugs that it eliminates.
I think the answer is #2, the tautology. But just because it’s a tautology doesn’t mean it’s a worthless thing to say. I think it’s also true, for instance (a corollary), that Rust eliminates more types of bugs than C does. And that may be valuable even if it does not mean that Rust eliminates all bugs.
>> safe Rust
> 1) not true as evidenced by this bug
Code used unsafe, putting us out of "safe" rust.
> Anybody who thought the simple action of rewriting things in Rust would eliminate all bugs was hopelessly naive.
Classic Motte and Bailey. Rust is often said "if it compiles it runs". When that is obviously not the case, Rust evangelicals claim nobody actually means that and that Rust just eliminates memory bugs. And when that isn't even true, they try to mischaracterize it as "all bugs" when, no, people are expecting it to eliminate all memory bugs because that's what Rust people claim.
> Classic Motte and Bailey. Rust is often said "if it compiles it runs".
That claims is overly broad, but its a huge, huge part of it. There's no amount of computer science or verification that can prevent a human from writing the wrong software or specification (let plus_a_b = a - b or why did you give me an orange when I wanted an apple). Unsafe Rust is so markedly different than safe default Rust. This is akin to claiming that C is buggy or broken because people write broken inline ASM. If C can't deal with broken inline ASM, then why bother with C?
> Classic Motte and Bailey.
For this to be a "classic motte and bailey" you will need to point us to instances where _the original poster_ suggested these (the "bailey", which you characterize as "rust eliminates all bugs") things.
It instead appears that you are attributing _other comments_ to the OP. This is not a fair argumentation technique, and could easily be turned against you to make any of your comments into a "classic motte and bailey".
> That doesn’t mean Rust provides no value over C
The real question is "does it provide this greater value for _less_ effort?"
The answer seems to be: "No."
No, the real question is whether it provides that greater value for a reasonably acceptable, commensurate effort. Looking for greater value with less effort is looking for a free lunch, and we all know TANSTAAFL.
I feel like everyone involved in the Linux Kernel Rust world is ironically woefully unaware of how Rust actually works, and what it's actually capable of. I suspect that Rust gurus agree with me, but don't want to say anything because it would hurt Rust adoption in places where it actually is helpful (encryption algorithms...)
Kernels - and especially the Linux kernel - are high-performance systems that require lots of shared mutable state. Every driver is a glorified while loop waiting for an IRQ so it can copy a chunk of data from one shared mutable buffer to another shared mutable buffer. So there will need to be some level of unsafe in the code.
There's a fallacy that if 95% of the code is safe, and 5% is unsafe, then that code is only 5% as likely to contain memory errors as a comparable C program. But, to reiterate what another commenter said, and something I've predicted for a long time, the tendency for the "unsafe block" to become instrumented by the "safe block" will always exist. People will loosen the API contract between the "safe" and "unsafe" sides until an error in the "safe" side kicks off an error in the "unsafe" side.
> Every driver is a glorified while loop waiting for an IRQ
This is so obviously false that I suspect there's the reason you don't see any Rust gurus agreeing with you.
Drivers do lots of resource and memory management, far more than just spinning on IRQs.
I should probably ask what experience do you have writing hardware drivers for the Linux kernel, but it's pretty obvious the answer is: none. I actually burst out laughing reading your comment, it's ridiculous.
My anecdotal experience interviewing big tech engineers that used Rust reflects GP's hunch about this astonishing experience gap. Just this year, 4/4 candidates I interviewed couldn't give me the correct answer for what two bytes in base 2 represented in base 10. Not a single candidate asked me about the endianness of the system.
Now that Rust in the kernel doesn't have an "experimental" escape hatch, these motte-and-bailey arguments aren't going to work. Ultimately, I think this is a good thing for Rust in the kernel. Once all of the idiots and buffoons have been sufficiently derided and ousted from public discourse (deservedly so), we can finally begin having serious and productive technical discussions about how to make C and Rust interoperate in the kernel.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but this comment is atleast partially incorrect right?
> Since it was in an unsafe block, the error for sure was way easier to find within the codebase than in C. Everything that's not unsafe can be ruled out as a reason for race conditions and the usual memory handling mistakes - that's already a huge win.
The benefit of Rust is you can isolate the possible code that causes an XYZ to an unsafe block*. But that doesn't necessarily mean the error shown is directly related to the unsafe block. Like C++, triggering undefined behavior can in theory cause the program to do anything, including fail spectacularly within seemingly unrelated safe code.
* Excluding cases where safe things are actually possibly unsafe (like some incorrectly marked FFI)
From my experience UB in Rust can manifest a bit differently than in C or C++, but still generally has enough smoke in the right area.
I believe their point was that they only needed to audit only the unsafe blocks to find the actual root cause of the bug once they had an idea of the problematic area.
EDIT: Hacker News has limited my ability to respond. Please keep in mind that Rust has a large number of active fans, who may have biases for whatever reasons.
The absence of UB, undefined behavior, everything-bad-can-happen, in an Rust-unsafe block can depend on Rust-not-unsafe code in the surrounding module. Thus, even a single block of unsafe can in theory require going through the whole module to figure out where it went wrong or to ensure correctness. And if access control was not properly used, possibly more than the module.
If you look at the mentioned patches, the fixes are to code outside the described unsafe block, in Rust-not-unsafe code. It is perfectly possible to introduce UB through changes to "safe" Rust, if those changes end up violating some assumptions in some Rust-unsafe block somewhere.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux...
Another way to introduce UB in Rust-not-unsafe, is if no_std is used. In that case, a simple stack overflow can cause UB, no Rust-unsafe required.
Surprisingly many Rust developers do not understand these points. It may take some of the shine off of Rust, so some Rust fans refrain from explaining it properly. Which is not good.
I guess the problem here is that you and the writer have different understandings of what "the error" means.
The author is thinking about "the error" as some source code that's incorrect. "Your error was not bringing gloves and a hat to the snowball fight" but you're thinking "the error" is some diagnostic result that shows there was a problem. "My error is that I'm covered in freezing snow".
Does that help?
Why do they allow unsafe parts in linux kernel in the first place? Why rewriting C code into unsafe rust?
It's important to note that the `unsafe` keyword is poorly named. What it does is unlock a few more capabilities at the cost of upholding the invariants the spec requires. It should really be called "assured" or something. The programmer is taking the wheel from the compiler and promising to drive safely.
As for why there is unsafe in the kernel? There are things, especially in a kernel, that cannot be expressed in safe Rust.
Still, having smaller sections of unsafe is a boon because you isolate these locations of elevated power, meaning they are auditable and obvious. Rust also excels at wrapping unsafe in safe abstractions that are impossible to misuse. A common comparison point is that in C your entire program is effectively unsafe, whereas in Rust it's a subset.
Rust is very nice for encapsulation. C isn't great at that work, and of course it can't express the idea that whatever we've encapsulated is now safe to use this way, in C everything looks equally safe/ unsafe.
EDIT: Hacker News has limited my ability to respond. Please keep in mind that Rust has a large number of active fans, who may have biases for whatever reasons.
On the other hand, Rust has some rules that are more difficult to uphold than C, for instance regarding aliasing. Especially in the Linux kernel, where it was decided that strict aliasing should be turned off when compiling C. When Rust-unsafe is used, the programmer has the responsibility of not violating those rules. That can be tricky, and many Rust developers either try to avoid using unsafe, or lean heavily on Miri, even though Miri can't handle everything.
It's worth noting that "aliasing" in Rust and C typically mean completely unrelated things.
Strict aliasing in C roughly means that if you initialize memory as a particular type, you can only access it as that type or one of a list of aliasable types look like char. Rust has no such restriction, and has no concept of strict aliasing like this. In Rust, "type aliasing" is allowed, so long as you respect size, alignment, and representability rules.
Aliasing safety in Rust roughly means that you can not have an exclusive reference to an object if any other reference is active for that reference (reality is a little bit more involved than that, but not a lot). C has no such rule.
It's very unfortunate that such similar names were given to these different concepts.
EDIT: Hacker News has limited my ability to respond. Please keep in mind that Rust has a large number of active fans, who may have biases for whatever reasons.
Multiple reasons:
1: Marketing and social media brigading, as Linus put it.
2: Pattern matching and enums, which are genuinely good.
3: Rust has some trade-offs that are closer to C++ than C, and those trade-offs have advantages and disadvantages.
4: Module system.
5: More modern macros.
6: Other advantages.
Rust also has a large heap of drawbacks.
https://steveklabnik.com/writing/does-unsafe-undermine-rusts...
You need unsafe Rust for FFI - interfacing with the rest of the kernel which is still C, uses raw pointers, has no generics, doesn't track ownership, etc. One day there might enough Rust in the kernel to have pure-Rust subsystems APIs which would no longer require unsafe blocks to use. This would reverse the requirements as C would be a second class citizen with these APIs (not that C would notice or care). How far Rust is to get pushed remains to be seen but it might a long time to get there.
The point at which you _could_ start to have undefined behavior is within an `unsafe` block or function. So even if the "failure" occurred in some "safe" part of the code, the conditions to make that failure would start in the unsafe code.
When debugging, we care about where the assumptions we had were violated. Not where we observe a bad effect of these violated assumptions.
I think you get here yourself when you say:
> triggering undefined behavior can in theory cause the program to do anything, including fail spectacularly within seemingly unrelated safe code
The bug isn't where it failed spectacularly. It's where the C++ code triggered undefined behavior.
Put another way: if the undefined behavior _didn't_ cause a crash / corrupted data, the bug _still_ exists. We just haven't observed any bad effects from it.
Somebody (tsoding?) called "unsafe" in Rust a "blame shifting device". If a bug was in an "unsafe" block, it is not Rust's fault, but solely the responsibility of the programmer, while every bug in a C program is obviously the language's fault alone.
Direct link to the mailing list entry at [0]. The fix for 6.19-rc1 is commit 3e0ae02ba831 [1]. The patch is pretty small (added some extra context since the function it's from is short):
And here is the unsafe block mentioned in the commit message with some more context [3]: [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2025121614-CVE-20...[1]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3e0ae02ba831da2b707...
[2]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e0ae02ba831da2b70790...
[3]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e0ae02ba831da2b70790...
The interesting part to me is that this bug does not necessarily happen in an unsafe block. The fix happens in an unsafe block, I think the API should change to avoid this. Perhaps by forcing users to pass a lambda to do stuff instead of having to manually lock and drop?
The `unsafe` block was present because `List::remove` is marked `unsafe` [0]:
I think it'd be tricky at best to make this particular API safe since doing so requires reasoning across arbitrary other List instances. At the very least I don't think locks would help here, since temporary exclusive access to a list won't stop you from adding the same element to multiple lists.[0]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e0ae02ba831da2b70790...
They're still 90% of the way to their goal. And there's only 90% left to go.
I think it's pretty telling that there are people in this thread trying to pre-empt the expected criticism in this thread. Might be worth thinking why there might be criticism, and why it wouldn't be the case if it was a different language.
Now we have vulnerabilities in two different flavors.
"That code can lead to memory corruption of the previous/next pointers and in turn cause a crash."
Oh no, what happened to Rust will save us from retarded legacy languages prone to memory corruption?
Well the article did mention it was in an undafe block
1) unsafe block still of "rust" code that rewritten in "rust" to be safe compared to previous C code. 2) Maybe there is no other way than use "unsafe" block sometimes in "rust", so is Rust a lie?
Rust constrains the code that can do unsafe things to small blocks, greatly reducing the area in which they can happen. Unlike C, where the whole of the code is unsafe.
Honestly seems like zig is shaping up to be a better fit for kernel. Regardless the language that attracts skilled kernel devs will matter more then lang.
It's true only for unsafe rust.
I'll confess I'm a bit less than well-read on this, but I can't help but wonder. How can increasing the number of languages in use within one enormous project possibly reduce critical vulnerabilities over the next decade?
If we're looking beyond one decade, then:
- As with all other utility, the future must be discounted compared to the present.
- A language that might look sterling today might fall behind tomorrow.
- Something something AI by 2035.