Time was, suppliers were so eager to sell anything to the DOD, on any terms, that they would turn their entire business models inside out just to get Federal contracts. The idea of said suppliers having any leverage, of any kind, in contract negotiations would have been completely absurd. Has that really changed?
Stuff being bought went from commodities that could be produced by anyone to state-of-the-art black magic that only a select few might be able to deliver in the future. It's not surprising that the leverage has shifted towards the supply side.
There is an element of truth to this. It's also true that the U.S. government is a terrible customer, especially for bespoke or expensive military goods. However, you can see my other comment https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47652717 for what is likely the greater contributing factor. Different outcomes require acquisition leaders that prioritize doing the right thing for the public, even if that pits them against their internal government "customers".
The highest priority in U.S. government acquisitions is to respect the business "rights" of suppliers and potential suppliers. It's hard to understand how tightly this is wound into the very foundations of USG acquisition until you've seen the inside of the process. There are a lot of pragmatic things the government ought to be able to do to best represent the public's interests, but the corporate supplier base's business interests almost always trump the public's interests. The exceptions are when acquisition officials buck the system, lay out expectations for technical data up-front, negotiate hard, and are willing to risk the supplier walking away.
The deference to corporate interests is deeply entrenched in how the U.S. government works. In my opinion and experience, it is also why the U.S. government fails so badly at so many things it does.
Imagine you are the end-user of the thing being acquired (e.g., a military service). You know the acquisition is system is slow, ponderous, and subject to a lot of high-level interference. You care less about the public's long-term interests than about getting the thing, especially when there's a strong risk you may never get the thing due to acquisition system failures. When you feel that sense of desperation, you let the acquisition process give away a lot to the supplier if it substantially improves the likelihood you get the thing, or the (real or perceived) timelines to get the thing.
Feels like it is a “supply chain risk” using the same logic Anthropic was labeled such. (Note I do not think any should be a supply chain risk, but if they were being consistent)
Don’t know why you’re being downvoted but it’s absolutely true. Crumbling infrastructure is the result of decisions like these where no long term vision for infrastructure exists. The last 5 years of warfare have shown that this is a liability.
Time was, suppliers were so eager to sell anything to the DOD, on any terms, that they would turn their entire business models inside out just to get Federal contracts. The idea of said suppliers having any leverage, of any kind, in contract negotiations would have been completely absurd. Has that really changed?
Stuff being bought went from commodities that could be produced by anyone to state-of-the-art black magic that only a select few might be able to deliver in the future. It's not surprising that the leverage has shifted towards the supply side.
There is an element of truth to this. It's also true that the U.S. government is a terrible customer, especially for bespoke or expensive military goods. However, you can see my other comment https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47652717 for what is likely the greater contributing factor. Different outcomes require acquisition leaders that prioritize doing the right thing for the public, even if that pits them against their internal government "customers".
Why would the military sign any agreement along these lines? It seems the polar opposite of what they would want.
The highest priority in U.S. government acquisitions is to respect the business "rights" of suppliers and potential suppliers. It's hard to understand how tightly this is wound into the very foundations of USG acquisition until you've seen the inside of the process. There are a lot of pragmatic things the government ought to be able to do to best represent the public's interests, but the corporate supplier base's business interests almost always trump the public's interests. The exceptions are when acquisition officials buck the system, lay out expectations for technical data up-front, negotiate hard, and are willing to risk the supplier walking away.
The deference to corporate interests is deeply entrenched in how the U.S. government works. In my opinion and experience, it is also why the U.S. government fails so badly at so many things it does.
Imagine you are the end-user of the thing being acquired (e.g., a military service). You know the acquisition is system is slow, ponderous, and subject to a lot of high-level interference. You care less about the public's long-term interests than about getting the thing, especially when there's a strong risk you may never get the thing due to acquisition system failures. When you feel that sense of desperation, you let the acquisition process give away a lot to the supplier if it substantially improves the likelihood you get the thing, or the (real or perceived) timelines to get the thing.
Feels like it is a “supply chain risk” using the same logic Anthropic was labeled such. (Note I do not think any should be a supply chain risk, but if they were being consistent)
[dead]
That is how empires fail.
Don’t know why you’re being downvoted but it’s absolutely true. Crumbling infrastructure is the result of decisions like these where no long term vision for infrastructure exists. The last 5 years of warfare have shown that this is a liability.