The readme has a lot of words but still does not clearly explain what this does or what you'd use it for.
The best I can gather is that this captures telemetry while you're running some computationally-expensive job, and checks that the resource usage roughly matches what it's supposed to be. But what does "Tamper-evident" mean? I assume you sign with your own private key? What exactly prevents the data from being faked?
> "A run of committed code, on attested hardware at time T, reading a model with hash m and a dataset with hash d, produced score S.” If d is a public benchmark, they also confirm it is the real benchmark, without you exposing it. The score is also cross-checked by the compute-cost certificate, which confirms the evaluation consumed the compute a real forward pass over the data requires.
They should really put that front and center. Still not a complete enough description, but something at least.
It didn't sound very convincing. It doesn't really prove anything other than the author signed the report. Unless the auditing is running from a secure enclave/core that the user has no access to, it can't do what is claimed on the tin.
The readme has a lot of words but still does not clearly explain what this does or what you'd use it for.
The best I can gather is that this captures telemetry while you're running some computationally-expensive job, and checks that the resource usage roughly matches what it's supposed to be. But what does "Tamper-evident" mean? I assume you sign with your own private key? What exactly prevents the data from being faked?
Found in the docs:
https://kveritas.org/docs/benchmarks - What a verifier learns:
> "A run of committed code, on attested hardware at time T, reading a model with hash m and a dataset with hash d, produced score S.” If d is a public benchmark, they also confirm it is the real benchmark, without you exposing it. The score is also cross-checked by the compute-cost certificate, which confirms the evaluation consumed the compute a real forward pass over the data requires.
They should really put that front and center. Still not a complete enough description, but something at least.
It didn't sound very convincing. It doesn't really prove anything other than the author signed the report. Unless the auditing is running from a secure enclave/core that the user has no access to, it can't do what is claimed on the tin.