Man I recently executed a migration from Aurora to Planetscale. I seriously considered PingCap but decided against it because I thought they cloud pricing was too complex. I wonder if my personal information is in the leak.
If true, this is next level incompetence from PingCap. Apparently the attackers set up a replication pipeline for a month?!
> We even stood up a replication feed of their own control-plane database using credentials committed in their own repositories — GCP service-account keys and an Azure service principal — and let their infrastructure deliver it to us. Every six hours, for the last twenty-two days of the campaign, from 8 September to 30 September, that pipeline faithfully re-exported every table of the operational heart of TiDB Cloud — tenants, users, API keys, cluster credentials, changefeeds, migrations — and pushed it out.
AWS private rates gives PingCAP ~47% off list price. Wonder which services got the biggest discounts? Unsurprisingly for a db company the cross-az traffic is 15% of their bill.
First the Google Cloud outage [0], then the CA private key leak [1]...
...and now this...
> Today we are making the PingCAP breach public. We possess the complete TiDB Cloud control plane, its billing and finance estate, its GCP storage estate and its AWS cost and billing estate, its Jira, its CRM, its analytics, its source code, and a four-year log of every connection every customer ever made to its product, from the IP addresses of their application servers.
This is an entire leak of ALL PingCap TiDB's customers AND data.
I am reading this as a leak of every possible piece of metadata but not an actual leak of customer data. They have SQL logs which do contain customer data and there is a mention of some snapshots/imports.
Man I recently executed a migration from Aurora to Planetscale. I seriously considered PingCap but decided against it because I thought they cloud pricing was too complex. I wonder if my personal information is in the leak.
If true, this is next level incompetence from PingCap. Apparently the attackers set up a replication pipeline for a month?!
> We even stood up a replication feed of their own control-plane database using credentials committed in their own repositories — GCP service-account keys and an Azure service principal — and let their infrastructure deliver it to us. Every six hours, for the last twenty-two days of the campaign, from 8 September to 30 September, that pipeline faithfully re-exported every table of the operational heart of TiDB Cloud — tenants, users, API keys, cluster credentials, changefeeds, migrations — and pushed it out.
AWS private rates gives PingCAP ~47% off list price. Wonder which services got the biggest discounts? Unsurprisingly for a db company the cross-az traffic is 15% of their bill.
what is happening today
and how are people not talking about this more
First the Google Cloud outage [0], then the CA private key leak [1]...
...and now this...
> Today we are making the PingCAP breach public. We possess the complete TiDB Cloud control plane, its billing and finance estate, its GCP storage estate and its AWS cost and billing estate, its Jira, its CRM, its analytics, its source code, and a four-year log of every connection every customer ever made to its product, from the IP addresses of their application servers.
This is an entire leak of ALL PingCap TiDB's customers AND data.
All of this in a single day. It is over.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50163961
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50166579
I am reading this as a leak of every possible piece of metadata but not an actual leak of customer data. They have SQL logs which do contain customer data and there is a mention of some snapshots/imports.
How the fuck is 10.6TB metadata?
Easily at scale
Size is not a good indicator for content quality
Don't forget the PHP megabomb dropping in a few hours too.