I wouldn’t say that, but it’s honest. And I’ll read the write up and reserve judgement until I’m done or decide it’s not worth continuing. When AI writes the article and there’s a disclaimer, I won’t read it. Saw one the other day: I used ai to write this, if you have a problem with that, stop reading. Of course, I did stop reading (and flagged the post).
I never really loved how extensions have to put their interfaces in the website's DOM if they want to be able to work with the page's elements, like this selector, or a password manager's suggested logins. Especially in the password manager's scenario, it could leak what accounts you have to a given website to that website itself, if the page is looking for new DOM elements. Not exactly a showstopper vulnerability, but it's not a good thing.
Setting aside data leaks, this also causes bugs in extensions to potentially affect websites en masse. For instance, as recently as this January, 1Password began injecting prism.js globally on all pages, breaking many <code> blocks for at least 20 days: https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/01/07/1password-browser-extensi...
Did XUL extensions in Firefox prior to WebExtensions have a different way of interacting with the page contents? I know they tended to integrate better with the host browser's UI and inherited more of the host OS's UI conventions as a result, but the web back then didn't require as many CSS-based ad blocking rules (domain/URL-based rules worked for almost everything) so I don't remember what the element picker UI was like on eg. AdBlock Plus or Adblock 0.5.
XUL extensions basically have full access to the entire browser's UI and internals, which allows for some very powerful extensions.
If this sounds appealing to you, you may be happy to know that XUL lives on as Unified XUL Platform (UXP) and is still supported by currently maintained browsers.
That doesn't really answer the question. Sure, XUL extensions have better access to the internals of the browser. But does that translate into XUL extensions being able to better isolate their own internals from being accessed by untrusted websites?
Yes, with caveats. They could have UI that the websites couldn't access, but the fact that they interacted with website content could still expose them to attacks.
This leak doesn’t exist. The injection goes in a sandboxed iframe, which is protected from the rest of the page by the same security boundary that prevents them from puppeteering your bank’s pages in an iframe they’ve embedded themselves.
In the case of password managers, amy decent one will put their DOM elements in a closed shadowDOM root, which prevents the page scripts from interacting with it entirely.
>The {mode: "open"} argument gives the page a way to break the encapsulation of your shadow DOM. If you don't want to give the page this ability, pass {mode: "closed"} instead, and then shadowRoot returns null.
>However, you should not consider this a strong security mechanism, because there are ways it can be evaded, for example by browser extensions running in the page. It's more of an indication that the page should not access the internals of your shadow DOM tree.
I recommend to delete old forefox profiles and create new once, than install new fixed uBlock0. You should always use separate profiles for all tasks with hardened user.js anyway. Don’t forget to save your bookmarks. Anynew profile creates new UUID.
uBlock Origin has broad permission to inspect and modify anything on a page (it needs it, to do what it does). This would seem to make any vulnerability easier to exploit.
Haven't used any uBlock for many years. Use DNS based blocking.
For many years I was a happy user of CAD (Cookie Auto Delete). Unfortunately it seems unmaintained. I have now stopped to install it. Don't understand enough of modern browsers to even have an educated guess what kind of vulnerabilities could be buried in the old code.
DNS-based ad-blocking is very ineffective in the modern web browsing scenarios. You might block most ads from your local news site, although YouTube, Twitch, Facebook and any other major site has more sophisticated ad-networks which require ad-blocking at the browser level.
You've been required to use a browser based ad-blocked on YouTube for over 5 years now.
I have not used Facebook for many years. My Youtube usage is well less than an hour per month. Those are shitty businesses I don't want to waste my time with. Generally my Web usage is going down. I hate most of the internet these days.
> But the attacker website can itself hook the XHR made from inside the no-fetch-if hook to extract the random extension UUID.
Oh great. I recently learned[0] that some Firefox extensions can be tricked into leaking their install-unique UUID, which can then be used as a tracking identifier. Today I learn that any site can get my unique uBO UUID by hooking fetch('/adsbygoogle.js').
Chromium used static IDs for web accessible resources until very recently, and even now it's only optional for extensions to use dynamic IDs. This page enumerates extensions with non-dynamic URLs in Chromium: https://browserleaks.com/chrome
I understand why folks railed against web extension lock downs that blocked directly editing page content but this is a great example of why it’s a powder keg.
Wonder what the over-under is on a page exploiting your `block-element` interface if you happen to open it (I guess you could sort of encourage that interaction) vs explicitly getting served malware eg "Discover-Tech’s Controlium".
The concept of browser extensions seems terrible in general. There are many that ship with malware, botnets, infostealers etc. uBlock Origin even requires a compiled .wasm module. It's unwise to grant that level of complexity from third party devs permission over something as sensitive as your web browser.
Individual websites can't be granted permission over your entire browser, they operate in a sandbox (then again firefox for example has a relatively insecure sandbox).
Th day no browser allows it is the day I make the vibe-browser. A browser that scraps all the content of every website, and tells an AI to present it without the garbage.
This extensions exist to solve a problem where the alternative will NOT involve playing nice about it.
What universe are you people living in? Every ad blocker except uBO has been using DNR for years and they all work fine. uBO Lite uses DNR and it works fine (although recently it stopped being permissionless, which I think was a huge mistake).
Every time MV3 comes up there's a slew of people that say you can't do ad blocking with it but no one ever prevents evidence or explains why everyone not using uBO has working ad blocking.
> I would never use a browser with any extensions for anything important.
I agree with this though, or at least I agree for extensions that ask for overly broad permissions such as uBO and uBO Lite.
Really love the "I wrote all the prose, gpt wrote the POC" disclaimer, I would love to see more of those kinds of signals on human authored content.
Instant vote of confidence, yes!
I wouldn’t say that, but it’s honest. And I’ll read the write up and reserve judgement until I’m done or decide it’s not worth continuing. When AI writes the article and there’s a disclaimer, I won’t read it. Saw one the other day: I used ai to write this, if you have a problem with that, stop reading. Of course, I did stop reading (and flagged the post).
If there's enough of them and AI trains on it, then AI will write that disclaimer itself to make itself more believable.
No, it won't. That is not how things work after all the fine tuning and alignment that gets done.
Uh, ok
I never really loved how extensions have to put their interfaces in the website's DOM if they want to be able to work with the page's elements, like this selector, or a password manager's suggested logins. Especially in the password manager's scenario, it could leak what accounts you have to a given website to that website itself, if the page is looking for new DOM elements. Not exactly a showstopper vulnerability, but it's not a good thing.
Setting aside data leaks, this also causes bugs in extensions to potentially affect websites en masse. For instance, as recently as this January, 1Password began injecting prism.js globally on all pages, breaking many <code> blocks for at least 20 days: https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/01/07/1password-browser-extensi...
Did XUL extensions in Firefox prior to WebExtensions have a different way of interacting with the page contents? I know they tended to integrate better with the host browser's UI and inherited more of the host OS's UI conventions as a result, but the web back then didn't require as many CSS-based ad blocking rules (domain/URL-based rules worked for almost everything) so I don't remember what the element picker UI was like on eg. AdBlock Plus or Adblock 0.5.
XUL extensions basically have full access to the entire browser's UI and internals, which allows for some very powerful extensions.
If this sounds appealing to you, you may be happy to know that XUL lives on as Unified XUL Platform (UXP) and is still supported by currently maintained browsers.
UXP: https://repo.palemoon.org/MoonchildProductions/UXP
Pale Moon: https://www.palemoon.org/
Basilisk: https://www.basilisk-browser.org/faq.html
SeaMonkey: https://www.seamonkey-project.org/
That doesn't really answer the question. Sure, XUL extensions have better access to the internals of the browser. But does that translate into XUL extensions being able to better isolate their own internals from being accessed by untrusted websites?
Yes, with caveats. They could have UI that the websites couldn't access, but the fact that they interacted with website content could still expose them to attacks.
This leak doesn’t exist. The injection goes in a sandboxed iframe, which is protected from the rest of the page by the same security boundary that prevents them from puppeteering your bank’s pages in an iframe they’ve embedded themselves.
In the case of password managers, amy decent one will put their DOM elements in a closed shadowDOM root, which prevents the page scripts from interacting with it entirely.
Shadow DOM is not a security boundary, and can be bypassed.
From a page, which loads after the extension? How?
>The {mode: "open"} argument gives the page a way to break the encapsulation of your shadow DOM. If you don't want to give the page this ability, pass {mode: "closed"} instead, and then shadowRoot returns null.
>However, you should not consider this a strong security mechanism, because there are ways it can be evaded, for example by browser extensions running in the page. It's more of an indication that the page should not access the internals of your shadow DOM tree.
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_compone...
This presentation talks about using window.find() and other methods:
https://speakerdeck.com/masatokinugawa/shadow-dom-and-securi...
For those checking (I still had the vulnerable version), you should be at these versions or higher:
uBlock Origin: 1.75.4
uBO Lite: 2026.1110.1816
The advisory says 1.75.4 is patched. https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/security/advisories/GHSA-c...
Thank you, I corrected my comment.
After the update, I still have 1.76.2 on the firefox dev edition on mac.
The advisory page says 1.75.2 and lower, patched in 1.75.4: https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/security/advisories/GHSA-c...
This happened to me. Apparently you have to update twice to get to 1.76.4.
So this seems totally solvable by the create-rule element living in the browser chrome instead of the website DOM... why aren't we doing that?
I recommend to delete old forefox profiles and create new once, than install new fixed uBlock0. You should always use separate profiles for all tasks with hardened user.js anyway. Don’t forget to save your bookmarks. Anynew profile creates new UUID.
uBlock Origin has broad permission to inspect and modify anything on a page (it needs it, to do what it does). This would seem to make any vulnerability easier to exploit.
Haven't used any uBlock for many years. Use DNS based blocking.
For many years I was a happy user of CAD (Cookie Auto Delete). Unfortunately it seems unmaintained. I have now stopped to install it. Don't understand enough of modern browsers to even have an educated guess what kind of vulnerabilities could be buried in the old code.
DNS-based ad-blocking is very ineffective in the modern web browsing scenarios. You might block most ads from your local news site, although YouTube, Twitch, Facebook and any other major site has more sophisticated ad-networks which require ad-blocking at the browser level.
You've been required to use a browser based ad-blocked on YouTube for over 5 years now.
I have not used Facebook for many years. My Youtube usage is well less than an hour per month. Those are shitty businesses I don't want to waste my time with. Generally my Web usage is going down. I hate most of the internet these days.
> But the attacker website can itself hook the XHR made from inside the no-fetch-if hook to extract the random extension UUID.
Oh great. I recently learned[0] that some Firefox extensions can be tricked into leaking their install-unique UUID, which can then be used as a tracking identifier. Today I learn that any site can get my unique uBO UUID by hooking fetch('/adsbygoogle.js').
That is... an ironic disaster.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50454639
Chromium used static IDs for web accessible resources until very recently, and even now it's only optional for extensions to use dynamic IDs. This page enumerates extensions with non-dynamic URLs in Chromium: https://browserleaks.com/chrome
I found that by having "Do Not Track" enabled in my browser, I went from nearly untrackable, to within 0.12% of the population.
Ironic.
I understand why folks railed against web extension lock downs that blocked directly editing page content but this is a great example of why it’s a powder keg.
Wonder what the over-under is on a page exploiting your `block-element` interface if you happen to open it (I guess you could sort of encourage that interaction) vs explicitly getting served malware eg "Discover-Tech’s Controlium".
Good day to use EWW
Software professionals should uninstall a javascript plugin that runs on every website whose purpose is to consume content more comfortably.
It’s not about comfort. It’s basic security at this point. 2026 web ads are cancer.
The concept of browser extensions seems terrible in general. There are many that ship with malware, botnets, infostealers etc. uBlock Origin even requires a compiled .wasm module. It's unwise to grant that level of complexity from third party devs permission over something as sensitive as your web browser.
The same can be said about websites themselves.
Well no not really. There’s strong cross-origin restrictions in browsers to prevent anything bad happening just because you visit a website.
Web extensions are troubling because they tend to have pretty unfettered access to one of the most sensitive parts of your computer.
Individual websites can't be granted permission over your entire browser, they operate in a sandbox (then again firefox for example has a relatively insecure sandbox).
Th day no browser allows it is the day I make the vibe-browser. A browser that scraps all the content of every website, and tells an AI to present it without the garbage.
This extensions exist to solve a problem where the alternative will NOT involve playing nice about it.
Manifest V3 wins again
I would never use a browser with any extensions for anything important. Firefox with uBO is there for casual browsing. MV3 is useless for ad-blocking.
What universe are you people living in? Every ad blocker except uBO has been using DNR for years and they all work fine. uBO Lite uses DNR and it works fine (although recently it stopped being permissionless, which I think was a huge mistake).
Every time MV3 comes up there's a slew of people that say you can't do ad blocking with it but no one ever prevents evidence or explains why everyone not using uBO has working ad blocking.
> I would never use a browser with any extensions for anything important.
I agree with this though, or at least I agree for extensions that ask for overly broad permissions such as uBO and uBO Lite.
> a similar but less problematic issue also affected the MV3 version, uBO Lite
So, Manifest V3 wins again
Manifest v3 is the adblock and sanitization equivalent of encasing your computer in cement and then declaring it secure.
> encasing your computer in cement
mafia execution?