I still don't understand the purpose of gMSA. It almost seems like an admission that password rotation policies are nonsense, so you hide the password rotation deep in Windows, or in the case of your link, a credential-fetcher.
What exactly are we doing here? Am I the only one who thinks this is nuts?
Too many times I have had services break because a service account password expired or was changed without updating the relevant services becuase the service account was reused and not documented.
gMSA accounts solve these problems becuase the password is managed automatically, no need to manually update a service after you set it to run under a gMSA.
This also prevents service account misuse, only specific servers are allowed to access the password.
Unrelated but Infisical recently moved existing rbac features from their selfhosted version behind a paywall [1]. The discussion has had no response from the team in the past 2 days [2]
> Human approval doesn’t scale to developers creating and deprecating testing
> databases, Kubernetes clusters, and CI runners at will. Contemporary AD
> implementations deal with this by deferring authority. An admin token (sometimes
> hardcoded…) automatically joins new identities. [...]
> Even if you built all of the complex automations to reflect every testing database
> and Kubernetes pod in AD with automated admin approval, it’s security theater. The
> unified directory would exist on paper, but lack authority. [...]
> Modern cloud infrastructure automatically asserts machine identity: [...] In
> Azure, you can configure a machine identity in Entra ID and let Azure’s Instance
> Metadata Service (IMDS) automatically issue OAuth tokens when machines request
> them.
Okay, so configuring machine identities manually in AD doesn't "scale" to the container age, fine. But configuring machine identities in EntraID does? How is auto-issueing identities in AD "security theater", but auto-issueing identities in EntraID the way to go?
Instead, we have 20 passwords for 25 different internal dev tools. We have to pay $2.99/month to some "MDM" that barely has control of the machine.
AD was good in theory, but the weight of crap implementation that had to be preserved for backwards compatibility was awful. It was like IE6 unfortunately.
Kerberos is a really good concept. That should be what we're doing instead of paying $2.99/month*mac for management.
AD = LDAP, Kerberos, DNS and user/group/host policy. That is not really ever going away. Particularly for on-prem large institutions with lots of machines. In BYOD environments sure but I don't think that has supplanted your traditional company issued Lenovo/HP/Dell in the majority of institutions.
a lot of work moved away from those decices and to mobile phones and tablets.
But even on the bigger machines (avoiding the word desktoo) the world changed: Laptios are a lot nore common. There login to domain controler and fetching home directory, mijnting network shares for shared data, etc doesn't work anymore either as machines aren't on the company nerwork, even if provided by the company and under device manafment.
All that data management moved to O365 and other "cloud" syncing.
But all those things still require LDAP-like things and policies which can be managed in AD or similar.
AD is the worst, its the MS moat, to lock all into their vendor garbage.
I tell ppl all the time, AD is an infection, and wherever u see it, it must be eliminated.
Microsoft has never built any secure software ever or had its customers in mind, so putting AD at the center of ur organization and allowing it to fester, is not doing the needful
Avoid microsoft at all costs, or ur just clownstriking urself
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The funny thing is that AD has all the capabilities that are discussed here. Even AWS recommends it for kubernetes as a service account using gmsa: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/...
And you can use gMSA for IIS application pools as well. Completely passwordless.
I still don't understand the purpose of gMSA. It almost seems like an admission that password rotation policies are nonsense, so you hide the password rotation deep in Windows, or in the case of your link, a credential-fetcher. What exactly are we doing here? Am I the only one who thinks this is nuts?
The best password is the one you don't know.
Too many times I have had services break because a service account password expired or was changed without updating the relevant services becuase the service account was reused and not documented.
gMSA accounts solve these problems becuase the password is managed automatically, no need to manually update a service after you set it to run under a gMSA.
This also prevents service account misuse, only specific servers are allowed to access the password.
> As an example, GitHub automation requires personal access tokens or GitHub private keys and doesn’t work with any directory identity.
Can't you create an Entra app/service principal and use OIDC to avoid personal identities?
Yes. I just did this yesterday with a user-assigned managed identity so that GitHub Actions could deploy an Azure Function.
Unrelated but Infisical recently moved existing rbac features from their selfhosted version behind a paywall [1]. The discussion has had no response from the team in the past 2 days [2]
[1] https://www.reddit.com/r/homelab/s/teM83aKLMa [2] https://github.com/Infisical/infisical/discussions/9499
Shouldn't be surprising
It's what most VC backed faux open-source software companies have done for the past decade+ in order to lure in ~~victims~~ customers
anyone remember https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitium ? Now google cloud identity.
AI-generated blogspam. Also:
Okay, so configuring machine identities manually in AD doesn't "scale" to the container age, fine. But configuring machine identities in EntraID does? How is auto-issueing identities in AD "security theater", but auto-issueing identities in EntraID the way to go?Well, typically you'd use bicep or terraform for managing entra id. Manually configuring auth and identities is indeed a nightmare.
Yeah this blogspam didn't even explain how they solve the problem - it's just "use our thing".
Yeah but it kind of sucks.
Instead, we have 20 passwords for 25 different internal dev tools. We have to pay $2.99/month to some "MDM" that barely has control of the machine.
AD was good in theory, but the weight of crap implementation that had to be preserved for backwards compatibility was awful. It was like IE6 unfortunately.
Kerberos is a really good concept. That should be what we're doing instead of paying $2.99/month*mac for management.
AD isn't dead. It just became a cloud.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/managed-ide...
AD = LDAP, Kerberos, DNS and user/group/host policy. That is not really ever going away. Particularly for on-prem large institutions with lots of machines. In BYOD environments sure but I don't think that has supplanted your traditional company issued Lenovo/HP/Dell in the majority of institutions.
a lot of work moved away from those decices and to mobile phones and tablets.
But even on the bigger machines (avoiding the word desktoo) the world changed: Laptios are a lot nore common. There login to domain controler and fetching home directory, mijnting network shares for shared data, etc doesn't work anymore either as machines aren't on the company nerwork, even if provided by the company and under device manafment.
All that data management moved to O365 and other "cloud" syncing.
But all those things still require LDAP-like things and policies which can be managed in AD or similar.
Are you okay? You're typing like you're having a stroke.
AD is the worst, its the MS moat, to lock all into their vendor garbage.
I tell ppl all the time, AD is an infection, and wherever u see it, it must be eliminated.
Microsoft has never built any secure software ever or had its customers in mind, so putting AD at the center of ur organization and allowing it to fester, is not doing the needful
Avoid microsoft at all costs, or ur just clownstriking urself
>clownstriking urself?
You're the clown. Learn how to write.